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Politics of Decentralization Policy: Explaining the Limited 
Success of the Croatian Case after 2001
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Summary
The Croatian “decentralization package” from mid-2001 has shown how mul-
tiple pressures for shifting power to the local level may actually result in rela-
tive failure. The central government has ceded the control in particular policy 
sectors by shifting responsibilities for certain educational, welfare and health 
services to the counties and municipalities. However, the decentralization ini-
tiative was excessively marked as very limited and strongly labeled by the 
vertical policy dimension, expressing the dominance of top-down incentives 
of the central government in comparison to bottom-up initiatives stemming 
from the local government units. The 2001 decentralized package did not sub-
stantially increase the portion of local governments finance in total public fi-
nance, showing a failure to provide local government units with stronger fis-
cal capacity. The central government bodies also did not take into account the 
alternative proposals made by various policy actors ranging from academic 
institutions, researchers in NGOs, and associations of local government or-
ganizations. All these things have contributed to a relatively negligible influ-
ence of the horizontal policy dimension on the decentralization outcome. The 
whole process can therefore be described as centrally controlled decentraliza-
tion, or decentralization from above. 
Keywords: politics of local government reform, decentralization policy, decen-
tralization policy in Croatia, fiscal federalism, local government policy-ma-
king, policy capacity
“Fiscal decentralization is in vogue. Both in the industrialized and 
in the developing world nations are turning to devolution to impro-
ve the performance of their public sectors.”
(Oates, 1999: 1120)
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1. Context of and Rationale for Decentralization
Shifts in Central-Local Relations in Croatia 
In several studies devoted to the political economy of the Croatian local govern-
ment, a gradual establishment of one type of mono-centric, extremely centralized 
system of governance at the beginning of the 1990s was shown as one of the crucial 
characteristics of the Croatian system of public finance (Bajo, Jurlina Alibegović, 
2008; Jurlina Alibegović, 2002, 2007; Krtalić, Gasparini, 2007; Ott, Bajo, 2002; 
Rogić-Lugarić, 2011; Šimović, Čulo, Rogić-Lugarić, 2010). The establishment of 
a strongly centralized system of public finance with a limited role of local govern-
ment units in public spending was also depicted as one of the main problems in the 
Croatian system of governance (Perko Šeparović, 2001, 2003, 2010; Petak, 2002a, 
2002b, 2004, 2006; Petak, Kasapović, Lalić, 2004). The fact was marked as a basic 
constraint for further development and the increase of various forms of local go-
vernments’ capacity – fiscal, administrative, as well as policy capacity.1 The crucial 
point in developing the argument in this article is the finding that such a type of 
development is, to a certain degree, going in the opposite direction to the develop-
ment that is dominantly appearing around the world. In other words, what is now a 
dominant trend in contemporary governance systems is the relatively strong trend 
towards more decentralized structures in policy-making, affirmed in various forms 
of decentralizing modern polities in all parts of the world.2
This process became particularly pronounced at the beginning of the 1990s in 
the ex-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as one of the direct prere-
quisites for nearing their governance structures towards the standards of democratic 
order and market economy (Bird, Ebel, Wallich, 1995; Péteri, 2002). Croatia, how-
ever, as part of the former Yugoslavia, was faced with quite the opposite situation. 
During that time, a strong decentralized system was still established in Croatia, with 
an extremely high scope of local governments’ jurisdictions, where fiscal expendi-
tures of local governments contributed to over 35 percent of total public consump-
tion. It was a direct result of the liberalization of the socialist self-management or-
der, which was run by the Communist authorities since the mid-1960s. Figures in 
Table 1 on the next page clearly describe the above-mentioned process. By the end 
1 Beside the traditional emphasis on fiscal and administrative capacities of local governments, in 
the 1980s a discussion was initiated on policy capacity of local government, as a peculiar analyti-
cal concept opposite to the above-mentioned concepts. See Gargan (1981).
2 There is a vast body of literature devoted to the process (see Manor, 1999; Rodden, 2006; Treis-
man, 2007), and it is sufficient here to point out just one finding from this extensive corpus. In 
comparison to the late 1970s, when sub-national structures of government contributed to roughly 
20 percent of total public consumption, in the mid-1990s this share rose up to roughly 30 percent, 
or even more (Rodden, 2006).
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of this process, finalized in the 1980s, former Yugoslavia was a primer of a strongly 
decentralized country, based on the Titoist type of federalism, providing relatively 
strong autonomy of both federal and local government units.3 
Table 1. Long-term Fiscal Shares of Croatian Local and Regional Governments 
(as percent of total public consumption)
Yugoslavia (on average) Croatia 
1947-1951 1968-1970 1986 2009
Central government level 62.3 53.1 21.9 88.6
Federal units (republics) 24.3 18.3 38.7 –
Local government units 12.6 28.6 37.2 11.4
Funds not allocated 2.2
Source: Bogoev (1990), Petak (2006), Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia
Rationale for Decentralization
The question of appropriate level of decentralization in one country is connected 
with many variables, which cannot be easily encompassed by a single theory (Hank-
la, 2009). Moreover, trends towards decentralization are sometimes overlapping 
with the simultaneous re-centralization tendencies, particularly in countries with 
vulnerable democracies.4 De Vries (2000) showed that stronger tendencies toward 
decentralization in Western European democracies from the late 1980s were caused 
mostly by dominant values in political culture rather than by an inherent logic of de-
centralization itself. It was shown in the European political history that the same “ar-
guments have been used to defend and promote both decentralization and centraliza-
tion” (ibid.: 217). In other words, the question whether to centralize or decentralize 
is among the questions which depend on a multitude of factors.
Beside the questions relating to decentralization trends in particular countries, 
there is also a list of issues relating to institutional structure, expressed by various 
forms of relations between central and local/regional governments. There exists a 
3 In other ex-socialist countries a completely different situation was at play. Relating, for ex-
ample, to the specific Polish situation, Swianiewicz is arguing why there was “room for local 
self-government” in that period of time. It was actually because of the subordination of local ad-
ministration to higher tiers of government, which were under absolute control of the Communist 
party. Due to that fact, “local discretion to decide on financial issues or modes of service delivery 
was next to none” (Swianiewicz, 2005).
4 For re-centralization tendencies in Africa, see Wunsch (2001).
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dizzying array of relationships between national and sub-national levels of govern-
ment (Hankla, 2009; Wibbels, 2006). In many polities, the central government is 
clearly dominant, putting sub-national levels of governments into a position of pure 
agents of the central governments’ basic will. On the other hand, there are many 
polities with a very strong position of the local or regional level of governance, 
where governments located at these layers are able to compete with the government 
in provision of public goods. The above-mentioned cases are, of course, ideal types, 
with most polities located somewhere between two opposite sides.
But the basic question is why some countries have more decentralized institu-
tional structures than others, or why so many countries run such different policies 
in various sectors in order to decentralize their governance structures? Relatively 
reliable answers are provided by various forms of fiscal federalism literature, rang-
ing from initial contributions in the mid-1950s and the early 1960s (Tiebout, 1956; 
Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren, 1961), to a fully elaborated theory at the beginning of the 
1970s (Oates, 1972). Much of the literature of the first generation of fiscal federal-
ism sees decentralization policy as a kind of panacea for improving quality in go-
vernance by securing a more efficient provision of local public goods, rather in the 
way that in decentralized polities citizens can sort themselves geographically by 
“voting with the feet” (Tiebout, 1956) or by establishing advantages of the polycen-
tric over the mono-centric order (Ostrom, Tiebout, Warren, 1961).5 
In the decentralized, polycentric order, by enabling citizens to choose among 
different public goods at different scales of organization, it is possible to achieve 
an efficient system of local self-governance. Following that conclusion, an appro-
priate devolution policy should be designed in such a manner as to be capable of 
envisaging institutional arrangements that could match free citizens’ choice in the 
provision of public goods. The crucial point developed in such an approach is the 
distinction between provision and production of local public goods. Provision actu-
ally means the process by which various services are made available to consumers, 
while production relates to an actual physical process by which those services are 
coming into real existence. 
Why is such a type of distinction the crucial problem? Let us examine an idea 
developed by Ronald Oakerson (1999). In reply to some American social science 
scholars who thought that the emergence of metropolitan areas called for the crea-
tion of a metropolitan government, he pointed out that any kind of metropolitan 
consolidation is actually unnecessary. Instead of consolidation, it is quite sufficient 
to apply some sort of contracting out. Moreover, he very convincingly showed that 
5 For more on the differences between first and second generation literature on fiscal federalism, 
see Oates (1999, 2005).
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it happened in the majority of local governance situations in the United States. 
Although some social scientists and public officials considered massive consolida-
tion as the wave of the future, this in fact never happened. The reasons for this stem 
from the voters’ rejection of various kinds of consolidation proposals. The numbers 
of local government in the United States continued to grow, with just one exception 
related to school districts.
Dangers of Decentralization
In more recent literature devoted to fiscal federalism, the view of decentralization 
as a predominantly positive thing is called into question, arguing that in many ca-
ses it may appear also as a negative choice (Rodden, 2006; Treisman, 2007). Aside 
from the positive impact of decentralization on a more efficient provision of local 
public goods and services, more recent literature (Prud’homme, 1995) is pointing 
at regional inequalities and at the failure to solve this without a proper role for the 
central government, stressing the problem of possible macro-economic instability 
in a more decentralized polity, as well as pointing towards specific problems related 
with particular policy sectors, which are connected with a higher proclivity to cor-
ruption (Fisman, Gatti, 2002). 
Prud’homme’s paper opened a new chapter in fiscal federalism discussions. 
His emphasis on the bad side of decentralization – that decentralization can under-
mine allocative efficiency, diminish production efficiency, increase the level of cor-
ruption, and jeopardize stability (due to the fact that local and regional governments 
have little incentive to provide stabilization policies), produced a series of contested 
reactions, which can be summarized in the follow up comment to Prud’hommes’s 
paper, written by Charles McLure. He pointed out that “the benefits commonly as-
cribed to decentralization involve the degree of control that citizens have over de-
cisions that affect them; local governments are better to recognize differences in 
tastes between sub-national jurisdictions and to respond to asymmetries in informa-
tion at the local and national levels” (McLure, 1995: 224).
2. Key Actors in Decentralization Policy
We must now focus on the role of particular actors in the decentralization or re-cen-
tralization projects. There are numerous kinds of motivations staying in the back-
ground of behavior of special actors. In recent work devoted to the political econo-
my of decentralization reforms, various authors have pointed out that we are faced 
with different motivations which determine the logic of behavior of different actors. 
Various kinds of motivations can include necessities related to the urgent respon-
siveness to economic crisis, transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, deve-
loping requirements for more effective government in post-welfare era, necessary 
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to escape economic un-development and instability (Bird, Ebel, Wallich, 1995; 
Eaton, Kaiser, Smoke, 2010). Particularly interesting is the example of Bolivia and 
Colombia, where “decentralization has been framed as a means to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the state throughout the national territory” (Eaton, Kaiser, Smoke, 
2010: xiv).
Our basic hypothesis is that exactly that moment was the crucial trigger for 
re-centralization in Croatia at the beginning of the 1990s. Faced with a brutal war, 
accompanied by a temporary occupation of almost one third of its territory, the 
Croatian government extremely centralized public finance (Petak, 2002b, 2006). 
The bulk of public money finished in the hands of the central government, lea-
ving to local and regional units just one third of pre-war revenues. Additionally, a 
completely new territorial structure of local governments was established. The new 
territorial structure enabled the ruling elite a much easier control over the territory, 
because a number of local governments were established with the centre right-wing 
political parties (HDZ, HSS) as ruling political parties. Table 2 shows the structure 
of local government units over a longer period of time, covering the second part of 
the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. The number of units had 
slowly been decreasing from a little over 700 to a little more than 200 in the late 
1960s, with the lowest number reached in the mid-1970s, when the system of lo-
cal governance in Croatia was institutionalized within 100 monotypic communes 
(općine) and one city (the city of Zagreb). That was the structure of local self-go-
vernance with which Croatia was faced at the time of dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
Table 2. Structure of Croatian Self-Government
1952 1967 1992 1993 2010
Communes 637 183 100 418 429
Cities 1 69 126
Counties (kotari) 88 – – – –
Communes – average population 45.000* 4.734 3.145
Cities – average population 28.124 18.328
As emphasized above, shortly after Croatia achieved independence in 1991, 
a completely reverse model of local self-governance was implemented, with more 
than five hundreds units, including the additional meso-level with 20 regional coun-
ties (županije). By such a type of reform, the central government administration 
established control over a long list of services that had previously been provided 
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by local governments (police, fire-fighters, primary and secondary education, basic 
health-care, basic social services, etc.). It was followed by a remarkable diminish-
ing of the share of local governments in total public consumption, which dropped 
from roughly 35 percent down to 10 percent of total government expenditures. 
Recentralization was therefore the direct result of devising a tool for strength-
ening the legitimacy of the state throughout the whole territory.
At the beginning of the year 2000, a new centre left-wing coalition government 
designed the possibility for decentralization. Public officials in the central govern-
ment bodies devised their decentralization proposals on the basis of interdepart-
mental meetings, at which assistants of ministers re-calculated in ballpark figures 
the precise portions of educational, welfare or health services that might be taken 
on by counties or cities (Petak, 2006). Policy experts for decentralization connected 
with the domestic and international think tanks and NGOs – who had contributed 
considerable expertise on alternative proposals for decentralization – did not play a 
substantial enough role in formulating decentralization policy. 
3. Sequencing the Decentralization Reform Trajectory
Putting the Croatian Decentralization Package on the Agenda
The Croatian “decentralization package” was launched by 2001, run by the cen-
tral government initiative to decentralize some parts of services connected with the 
educational, social and social welfare system. The devolution process picked up 
speed in July 2001 when the Croatian Parliament passed the new Act on Local and 
Regional Self-Government, and enacted the amendments to several laws regulating 
local financing and social services, such as education, health insurance and social 
security. The government in fact transferred to the level of counties – and, in the 
case of primary education, to the cities with a higher fiscal capacity – the authority 
to finance certain aspects of primary and secondary education, social security and 
health insurance. In other words, those were the three spheres in which the share of 
the Croatian local government units was substantially smaller than in other transi-
tional countries.6 
In the first stage of decentralization, the central government renounced its por-
tion of the income tax to facilitate the provision of those functions transferred to the 
local level (Lukeš-Petrović, 2002). It was a very important policy measure because 
6 In comparison to many other transitional countries, at the beginning of the 1990s Croatia es-
tablished an extremely centralized system of health and social welfare services, with the sym-
bolic share of local government in these public policy sectors at around 1 per cent of total ex-
penditure outlays. The situation was a little better in the sector of education, where its share was 
around 16 per cent (Petak, 2006).
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the importance of income tax and surtax on income tax in financing local self-go-
vernment units in Croatia is very high. But the decentralized public finance package 
failed in giving to local government structures additional sources for providing new 
services in education and other sectors. Due to that fact, only around one third of 
municipalities accepted to run new services, for example, in education. The coun-
ties which were obliged to accept new devolved services responded by not running 
those services.
Formulating Policy Options and the Role of Policy Analysis
The reform approach in the Croatian devolution is basically built on functional re-
views made by senior officials in public administration bodies. The ministries and 
other state agencies have to undergo a functional review of all government activi-
ties, separating the core state functions from the series of social service functions. 
Given such circumstances, decentralization is regularly followed by civil service 
reform. But such a reform was proposed without taking into account the policy 
options connected with each and every decentralization measure (Lukeš-Petrović, 
2002). 
The Croatian “decentralization package” from mid-2001 is an example of how 
multiple pressures for shifting power to the local level may result in relative failure. 
The central government handed over the control over the entire policy process by 
shifting responsibilities for certain educational, welfare and health services to the 
counties and municipalities. A decentralization initiative was excessively marked 
by the vertical policy dimension, expressed by top-down incentives of the central 
government to shift the responsibilities to the regional and local levels. Central go-
vernment bodies did not take into account the alternative proposals made by various 
policy actors ranging from academic institutions, researchers in NGOs, associations 
of local government organizations, etc. All these things contributed to a relatively 
negligible influence of the horizontal policy dimension on the decentralization out-
come. 
Decentralization from Above: Running the Implementation of 2001 Reform Project
The whole process could be described as centrally controlled decentralization, or 
decentralization from above. One of the illustrations of such a conclusion is the 
limited success in decentralizing the operating educational costs to the city govern-
ments. Only one third of the cities have agreed to take part in the decentralization 
of educational services. The other two thirds of city governments simply calculated 
that their fiscal as well as their administrative capacity was insufficient to handle the 
new decentralized services. Taking into account the fact that “the decentralization 
package” in welfare and health was concerned only with the counties and not the 
cities, the limited scope of decentralization is becoming even more evident.
Politička misao, Vol. 48, No. 5, 2011, pp. 72-84
80
Central government bodies have mostly neglected to depict the role of pre-
paredness for implementing decentralization programs. Preparedness for running 
decentralization policy was marked by some policy scholars as one of the decisive 
factors influencing the outcomes of decentralization agendas (Davey, 2002). Pro-
clivity to decentralization due to demographic or institutional clusters or to specific 
functional characteristics of particular services (police, education, social welfare, 
housing, etc.) may just sketch out favorable or unfavorable opportunities for imple-
menting a decentralization agenda in a particular country. The real lack of such a 
type of policy analysis literature is the missing link for indicating the critical role of 
preparedness for decentralizing some services, which could not be connected mere-
ly with demographic, functional, fiscal, or administrative capacity, or even with 
social capital variables. It may simply be connected to a missing policy plan or to 
inadequate policy work as analysis for a policy. Let us use a comparative example 
from some Central European countries. 
The relatively unsuccessful Croatian decentralization project as of 2001 has 
confirmed the critical role of preparedness for achieving positive outcomes of a 
devolution policy in a particular country. By comparing the Hungarian and Slo-
vak decentralization cases, Kenneth Davey has shown that the relative success of 
devolution in Hungary should be credited to the fact that the Hungarian Institute of 
Public Administration had prepared a very good policy basis for decentralization 
during the late 1980s (Davey, 2002: 40). The Croatian case is more similar to the 
Slovak case, which was in general marked by a relative failure to run a comprehen-
sive decentralization project sketched out by the Slovak coalition government after 
it came to power in 1998. In both cases the crucial missing point was the lack of a 
coherent model for the devolution of competencies to local levels of governance. In 
the case of Croatia, the main reason for such an outcome was not so much the non-
-existence of this model, but the fact that decision-makers were reluctant to put on 
the agenda a model prepared by various policy experts sitting outside the govern-
ment. Furthermore, when evaluating these things, one should not neglect that the 
inadequate place of policy analysis as the analysis for policy emerged as the deci-
sive fault in the policy literature reviewing decentralization tendencies in Croatia 
and in other transitional countries. Preparedness for decentralization turned out to 
be a much tougher thing then was initially shown in most analyses of decentraliza-
tion trends in these countries.
The basic conclusion is that the limited scope in employing policy analysis 
is not confined only to the role of horizontal policy actors, but also to the limited 
role of policy analysis in the work of the Croatian public administration system as 
a whole (Petak, Petek, 2009). The Croatian case has therefore confirmed the criti-
cal role of evidence-based policy for successful devolution policy in a particular 
country.
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Conclusion
The basic trigger for further decentralization is located within the political elite. 
The dominant motivation from the early 1990s, related to running the state legiti-
macy through the whole territory, twenty years later is dramatically changed. The 
basic rationale for conducting new steps in decentralizing governance structures in 
Croatia might be found in more effective provision of public services. But develop-
ing more robustness of local governments for providing public services may require 
an amalgamation or consolidation of numerous municipalities with a low level of 
fiscal, administrative and policy capacity.7 
In addition to political willingness, we should mention the requirements re-
lating to capacity for strategic planning (Perko Šeparović, 2010) and steering the 
whole process of decentralization (Koprić, 2008). One important source for deve-
loping such a type of decentralization is based on coherent policy programs of de-
centralization developed since 2000.8 This can be labeled as one sort of evidence-
-based policy-making which can redirect Croatian local and regional governments 
into more effective service provision.
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